A BIBLICAL MODEL FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In the discipline of International Relations (IR), there is a rising interest in the inclusion of the religious dimension or paradigm (Johnston and Sampson, 1994) in areas such as politics and governance. Much of this has had to do with the importance of Islamic states in recent years, and the ideas of those who advocate Qur'anic norms are increasingly being seriously considered (Piscatori, 1986). Surprisingly, not as much attention is being paid to a growing movement in Christian theological circles, theonomy.

Theonomists advocate Biblical norms, as revealed in God's law (theos = God, nomos = law) (Bahnsen, 1984). Those within the IR discipline have essentially ignored theonomists, who insist that Biblical law, from the Ten Commandments to their case-law applications in the Old and New Testaments, are binding both morally and judicially today (North, 1990:81). Theologically, they are "covenantalists;" that is, their paradigm is structured along a five-point Biblical covenant model: 1) God is absolutely transcendent yet universally present; 2) man's institutions possess hierarchical authority; 3) man's "tool of dominion" is God's law; 4) God's judgment is two-fold (blessings and cursings); and 5) God's kingdom has continuity in history (Sutton, 1987). In theonomists' eyes, religion is the "crucial issue" in international relations, not politics or economics; it is the chief division and chief connection among men and nations (North, 1987a:18).

In the face of secularist criticism, theonomists espouse complete confidence that theirs is the only approach which is viable; in their view, without Biblical law, it is not possible to create an intellectual system or an academic discipline which is self-consistent (North, 1990:8). This holds true from the individual level, all the way through to the international level; the Bible is not only the supreme law of Christians who acknowledge its veracity, but also for every actor, including every nation. God judges all nations, both in history and at the end of time, according to this standard, and therefore, theonomists as sert, this "God-established fact" must necessarily be publically affirmed by every nation, both in history and at the end of time (North, 1987a:6).

For theonomists, there is a "cultural mandate" set forth in Genesis 1:26-28 which obliges mankind under God's covenant to subdue all the earth and exercise dominion over it, under God (DeMar, 1987:184). The program for that purpose is the law, which prov ides the means ordained by God for developing and improving animals, plants, men, and institutions in terms of the duty they possess to fulfil the purpose of God (Rushdoony, 1973:724-725). This would certainly include questions of integration among nation s in the field of international relations, though there has been little literature specifically directed at that discipline (North, 1987a; Jordan, 1988). Much of this paper draws on the work of the theonomists, who have detailed the Biblical "blueprints" for political and societal structures, especially as given for the nation of Israel before the time of its transformation into a centralized kingdom.

Proposed Program: Decentralized Confederative Republic
This paper will propose a program for European integration based on the model of pre-Kings Israel, a constitutional confederative republic described in the Old Testament of the Christian Bible. It will argue that this program is likely to succeed based o n three criteria: its recognition of existing common European values which are sufficiently encompassing for such a program, its employment of a "true" free market economic system, and its political decentralization to the smallest units of society.

The program of integration being proposed here is a constitutional, decentralized, confederative, popular, representative republic - qualities which pre-Kings Israel of the Old Testament possessed. Israel had a constitution, which took form first as Séfer Ha-Brit (Exodus 20) and later as Sefer Torat Moshe (Joshua 8:31, 23:6) (Elazar and Cohen, 1985:63). It was decentralized, with authority going from the b ottom up (Exodus 18) (North, 1987a:51). It was confederative, in that it was a voluntary union of mostly independent nations (Joshua 22; II Samuel 2) ( Jordan:1988:55). It was popular, because it was agreed to by the people as a whole (Exodus 19:7-9). It was representative, because the tribal (national) leaders were elected by the people (Numbers 1:16, 16:2) to serve in an Assembly (Numbers 10:4). It was a republic, because there was a balance of powers (Exodus 12:21,28; Numbers 11:16-17,24-26) exercised by chosen representatives of t he body of citizens, and given to the citizens themselves (Numbers 10:2-4) (Grant, 1987:40).

Reasons why proposed program is likely to succeed

Cultural: "Diversified Europeanism"

This section will analyze the shared value-system and way of life of pre-Kings Israel, utilizing those components which are relevant to the current situation in Europe and suggesting how they would be implemented in the proposed program.

The national union in pre-Kings Israel, which was built upon confederation, exhibited a unifying feature of a common cultural heritage of moral and civil principles (Jordan, 1988:55), while each tribe retained both a large degree of political independence and its independent lineage (Elazar and Cohen, 1985:62). The same would hold true in the proposed program: as T.S. Eliot (1949:127) stated, Europe has a basis of cultural unity in the ancient civilizations of Rome, Greece, and, through Christianity, Isr ael. "This unity in the common elements of culture, throughout many centuries, is the true bond between us. No political and economic organization, however much goodwill it commands, can supply what this culture unity gives." E.C. Wines (1980:56-57) agr ees, adding his belief that even the universal fondness for travel exhibited by Europeans "constitutes the strongest bond of union between the people and states," going on to relate this to the union which the three annual festivals in Israel developed amo ng the Israelites.

This cultural value-sharing, the result of the overlapping of the diverse cultures of the nations of Europe, is not sufficiently encompassing to support any type of centralized integration, such as is being attempted under the Maastricht Treaty for European Union (EU) (Safire, 1990; Ludlow, 1992). Indeed, while the Europeans have many values in common, they have exist ed for generations without such unification (Etzioni, 1965:254). Since the proposed decentralized program recognizes and encourages the diversity of cultures in the various nations, yet supports the existing European culture which is based on a common her itage and belief-system, it would be much more likely to fit contemporary Europe's " way of life," which Deutsch defines as "a set of socially-accepted values and of institutional means for their pursuit and attainment, and a set of established or emerging habits of behavior corresponding to them" (Deutsch, 1957:47-48).

Economic: free market

This section will analyze the economic system of pre-Kings Israel, utilizing those components which are relevant to the current situation in Europe and suggesting how they would be implemented in the proposed program, contrasting them with those of post-Maastricht EC.

Pre-Kings Israel employed a free market system of economics (North, 1990). The right of private property was everywhere assumed by the constitution (Wines, 1980:41), since the people believed it was essential to their well being, both individually, and a s a whole (Wines, 1980:22-25). In fact, in the Pentateuch, the main purpose of the second table of the decalogue is to guard the institution of property rights (Wines, 1980:41), which Victor Canto (1985:51) defines as " rights associated with uses of econo mic goods." These rights include the right to make decisions as to the use of the goods in question, as well as to their transferability.

In the proposed program for European integration, the protection of property rights would also be assured. Terry Anderson (1982:761) assesses the resultant economic system as being one that focuses on "the rules of the game" which determine who has acces s to resources and who has use of them: "If property rights are well-defined, enforced, and transferable, authority will be linked with responsibility and individual actors will act as if they care about social benefits and costs." Anderson makes several suggestions for basing areas of frequent contention, such as water rights, on a system of decentralization. Included are the elimination of restrictions on water transfers, ownership of water for in-stream purposes, and assignment of rights to stocks and flows in groundwater basins (Anderson, 1982:788-789). Hirshleifer, et al. (1960), also argue that if water rights were allowed to become certain and secure without "limitation on transferability," the market process and individual decision-making would tend to "allocate water resources to their most productive use: high-valued uses would bid the water away from low-valued uses."

Pre-Kings Israel also enjoyed a good deal of commercial trade, due to its geographical situation and its open borders policy. The major trading centers of Tyre and Sidon were on its borders, and the rich desert caravans continuously passed through Israel , affording its inhabitants the benefit of foreign nations' enterprise without hazard or expense to themselves (Wines, 1980:35).

Similarly, in the proposed program, a free market economic system with no restrictions on international trade will be a hallmark (North, 1984). The EU program will likely restrict many market forces, as the EEC and the EC have done (Bowie and Geiger, 196 1:7; Aeppel, 1989:9), utilizing its technocracy to engage in some economic planning and price-setting. In fact, as Wallerstein (1984:143) noted, many economic pundits look forward to the extention of a centrally-planned redistributive system in Europe; ho wever, as Jacobs puts it, "the failure of national governments and blocs of nations to force economic life to do their bidding suggests some sort of essential irrelevance" (Jacobs, 1984:31-32), at least in a positive manner, to the nation's economic workin gs.

Such a planned system has been called "formally irrational," meaning that there is less potential for the central decision-makers to be rational, because they cannot possibly make all of the small decisions which can be made in a market economy (Leube, 19 87:22-24). In place of the estimations which can be obtained from a price system that reflects supply and demand, it substitutes the preferences of central planners. As Schlossberg (1983:227-228) observed, "the system ignores the information contained in billions of decisions throughout the economy - information that finally is made available to everyone in the form of price - because the planner's will replaces the action of the market, eradicating from the economy the rational use of supply and demand i nformation provided by price fluctuations".

It is commonly acknowledged that a free international economic order requires the free flow of goods and capital (Blake and Walters, 1987:60); although it claims to be dropping trade barriers in its internal market (Articles 19-28) (Grenville, 1987:225), the EC program originally inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome has actually provided for the possibility of the setting up of an external trade barrier between itself and the rest of the world. Despite the public denials of European politicians, many non-European officials fear this has already begun to take place (Aeppel, 1989:9).

Like pre-Kings Israel, though, Europe under the proposed program would have both a free internal market, with no centralized state planning, and open borders with non-European countries; in other words, international market competition's full pressure, wi th low or no import quotas, tariffs, government-guaranteed loans, export bounties, or similar restrictions on trade (North, 1987a:190). The reason for instituting such a system, as one analyst observed, is that the free market's international character, as opposed to the state's national character, reinforces decentralization. The EU, though, has the potential for restricted markets if multi-national corporations continue their policies of using the state to protect their own interests. In the proposed program (as one student of Adam Smith observed), "so long as the domestic market is open to competitive forces from outside, a limit is set to monopoly powers of all kinds," whether those powers are exercised by individual firms, groups of workers, groups of producers, or whole industries (Cairncross, 1976:127).

Another aspect of pre-Kings Israel which the proposed program would employ would be its utilization of a fixed monetary standard (such as gold or silver - whatever the market dictates), with no debasing of currency (Leviticus 19:35-36), and a policy of discouraging usury and fractional reserve banking (Exodus 22:25-27) (North, 1987a:189; North, 1986). The leaders of the EU, on the other hand, plan to initiate the European Cur rency Unit's (ECU's) conversion into a common currency and to form a central bank, similar to the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, to deal with monetary policy for all of Europe ("Architect", 1989:9). The proposed decentralized program would avoid such attempts at centralized control of the European economy, thereby minimizing continuing political and economic problems with national and international finance capital (North, 1987a:189). The abolition of central banking and the introduction of market-based currencies, on the other hand, would be likely to make the value of money more stable with cyclical downturns less severe (as was the case in the United States from 1839 to 1913) (Rahn, 1989:355-356).

Political: Decentralized

This section will analyze the political system of pre-Kings Israel, utilizing those components which are relevant to the current situation in Europe and suggesting how they would be implemented in the proposed program. In pre-Kings Israel, the people tended to identify themselves in terms of small localities, each one precious and unique in its own way. As James Jordan (Jordan, 1988:15) acknowledges, this points to the "intensely local character" of their government; centralization was "eminently foreign " to their spirit (Wines, 1980:242). The current situation in Europe is similar in this respect, with many people looking to their original regional nations, extended "families," and "tribes" (J. Friedman, 1990:14), instead of to a supranational European government such as the one being proposed in Maastricht's EU program (Goldstein, 1992) . Pre-Kings Israel went from the bottom up, with "rulers of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties, and of tens," (Exodus 18:21 - ten households, not ten persons, nevertheless a "very small governmental unit"). Most decisions were handled at the local level, with only more difficult problems going up the line through the next higher levels of government. All day-to-day decisions were to be made at the local level, with few matters being of concern to the larger units of government (Exodus 18:22) (Jordan, 1988:15). Europe under the proposed program would be similarly decentralized (see Cairncross, 1976:126-127) with much greater sovereignty at the local levels than exists today.

Even the seat of the Hebrews' confederative government did not remain fixed in one location (unlike that of the EU's Commission, which is to be headquartered in Brussels), but was relocated to wherever the foundation of their constitution, the Ark of the Covenant, was sited. Some of the places where it was located include Gilgal (Joshua 4:19; I Samuel 7:6), Shiloh (Joshua 18:1, 19:51; Judges 21:19-21), and Mitzpeh (I Samuel 7:5-12) (Elazar and Cohen, 1985:62). Similarly, the European nations under the proposed program could rotate the location of their seat of government among themselves, helping to avoid the appearance of favoritism of one nation over another.

Even elected and appointed officials would likely be more satisfied with the decentralized political system under the proposed pre-Kings Israel-based program. As Feld and Wildgen (1976:175) noted, these officials' objectives are generally better served by smaller, more familiar political units than by larger integrated units, such as those being implemented under post-Maastricht EC. As a result, national and local officials often engage in a "politics of rejection" in their dealings with the larger centralized unit, bringing an outcome of less efficiency and effectiveness.

Confederation

The tribes in the pre-Kings Israel system together formed a confederative republic, in which nothing could be resolved or done without their respective representatives' general consent. Each of the tribes also formed its own constitution on the national constitution's model (Wines, 1980:140). This was a confederative nation of equal tribes, the result of what Norman Gottwald (1979:322) calls the principle of segmentation, in which the various tribes were composed of segments which were politically equal. Such segmentation carried through from the lowest level to the most inclusive level of organization in the nation. There was an absence of heavily centralized political power, either in the nation as a whole or in the individual tribes, yet there was still a limited government over the nation of Israel (Gottwald, 1979:380). The fundamental aspects of this government, which would hold true under the proposed decentralized program for European integration, were its constitution, its existence as a "nation of nations", and its well-defined republican functions.

Constitution

The constitution of pre-Kings Israel, the main form of which is found in Exodus 20 (and which was reaf firmed in Joshua 8:31-32, 23:6) (Elazar and Cohen, 1985:67), was adopted by the Israelite people themselves, (Exodus 19:8) as a nation (Wines, 1980:15 ). Under it, the individual tribes retained their internal autonomy and distinctiveness, but were nevertheless bound together by "their common allegiance to the composite bonds of the constitution" (Elazar and Cohen, 1985:67). This constitution spelled o ut all of the main ideas of Israel's government, from its branches to its bill of rights, even determining the boundaries of the tribes (Jordan, 1988:14-15). Any constitution drafted under the proposed program could be modeled after this constitution and accepted by the whole of the European people themselves. At present, there is no "European Constitution" (though there are proposals for one to replace the current hodgepodge of treaties).

"Nation of nations"

The powers which were reserved to the individual Israelite tribes by the constitution were very great and were freely exercised, so that they often acted as independent nations (Joshua 17:15; Judges 4:10). The tribes even had limited rights of secession (I Kings 12:1-20). However, the constitution, which had been agreed to and accepted by the people, was binding on all member tribes, which had to abide by the decisions of the national legislature (Numbers 36), especially concerning constitutional deviance. A tribe could not secede simply because it was guilty of a constitutional infraction and did not wish to abide by those decisions (Judges 20:20) (Wines, 1980:113-116,127-128). Because the tribes retained such a large degree of independence under the constitution, though, with each one composing an entire political community independent in many respects of the others (Wines, 1980:112), they may be referred to as separate nations, and so pre-Kings Israel may be designated as confederative.

While there existed in Israel regional divisions (I Kings 20:14) and separate tribes (Exodus 28:21), the entire people were seen as being politically constituted (Exodus 12:3) (Elazar and Cohen, 1985:62). The polity was organized according to the principle of bottom-up segmentation. Gottwald describes this organization as going from the extended families (or households), to the "protective associations" of extended families, then to the primary segments (the tribes), and finally reaching the highest organizational level, the league of tribes which was the nation of Israel (Gottwald, 1979:338-341).

The constitution set fixed governmental boundaries for the tribes, devoting seven Old Testament chapters to the task (Joshua 13-19) (Jordan, 1988:41). It also spelled out their equality in the areas of political rights and di gnity. As can be seen from Judges 1:1-2, no single tribe had any right of command or political superiority over any other (Wines, 1980: 112).

In the same manner, the constitution of the proposed program would inaugurate a "nation of nations," where no one or two nations would have a hegemony of rights or power greater than the others, and a large degree of independence and autonomy would be mai ntained. This is unlike the situation in the European Union, where the more economically powerful countries of France and Germany are likely to hold sway (Jacobs, 1984:201). Integration programs such as th at of the EEC, the EC, or the EU, as opposed to the proposed decentralized program, aim towards limiting local autonomy and replacing it with more centralized decision-making, as Haas notes (Haas, 1966:94).

Republic

The Hebrew constitution fully embodied the principle that the ruled should elect the rulers, and that "authority should emanate from those over whom it is to be exercised." An example of this can be seen in Deuteronomy 1:13, where the people elected their magistrates from among themselves, not from any privileged class (Wines, 1980:14-15). While the EU's elected elite (such as those in the European Parliament) come to office in somewhat similar fashion (the majority through national list systems of proportional representation) (Keating and Jones, 1985:9), the system to which they are elected is much different in structure and operation than the system in the proposed decentralized program.

All three main branches of government in pre-Kings Israel operated in this republican manner: the executive, headed by the prime minister; the legislative, consisting of the senate (a body of tribal leaders) and "the congregation of Israel" (the popular branch); and the judicial, which was the magistracy (Harrington, 1901:198). Wines (1980:98) proposes that there was a fourth branch, the "oracle of Jehovah," where God, as true King over Israel, would give direct answers to specific questions put forth by the Prime Minister; however, for the purposes of the proposed program, assuming it will lack the benefits of hearing directly from God, the three main branches will suffice, under the direction of the constitution.

Executive
While the constitution made it conceivable that pre-Kings Israel could have survived without a common head, and that this in fact occasionally occurred (see Judges 19:1), there was provision for a "chief Judge" (Deuteronomy 17:12) who was a type of republ ican president (Wines, 1980:143). The first to occupy this position of Eved Adonai (Prime Minister of the Lord) was Moses, with Joshua succeeding him (Numbers 12:8; Joshua 1:16-18) (Elazar and Cohen, 1985:62). The following "job description" of the Chief Executive may also be applied to the same position in the proposed program.

The office was not hereditary (Numbers 27:18-23), but was instead elective (Numbers 28:19,22; I Samuel 7:5-8). The "Prime Minister" was elected by the people in four stages: "the preliminary discussion, the nomination, the presentation to the people, and the installation" ( Judges 10:17-11:11) (Wines, 1980:148-149, 107-110). The Chief Judge's power could not go beyond the legal bounds of the constitution. While he could give orders as commander-in-chief, he could not contradict laws inherent in the constitution or enacted by the legislature. He was accorded no salary, but he could accept presents given to him "as testimonials of respect" (Judges 8:24; I Samuel 9:7, 10:27). He did not have the right of appointing officers (with the possible excepti on of those in the army), and he did not have the power to lay tax burdens on the people. In sum, the prime minister's power was not arbitrary, it was constitutional (Wines, 1980:152-154).

Flowing from this source, the chief executive's office was also, in a sense, judicial. In this bottom-up decentralized system, a limited number of hard-to-decide cases ended up being referred to the Prime Minister, or Chief Judge; he then consulted the oracle of Jehovah for an answer. Being without the benefit of this oracle in the proposed program, this would not really be a function of the Prime Minister, but would fall to the supreme court.

Judiciary
The judicial system in pre-Kings Israel was a bottom-up appeals court magistracy (see Exodus 18) (North, 1987a:51), with the supreme court (the Sanhedrin) established in Deuteronomy 17:8-11 as the en d process of cases which were too hard to judge at the lower levels. There were magistrates (shoterim ) in every city and the surrounding districts (Deuteronomy 26:18), with judges over tens, fifties, hundreds, and thousands, (Exodus 18:25) approximately 78,600 judges in all. The judicial office was elective, though those elected were commissioned by the supreme Judge (Deuteronomy 1:13). This supreme Judge himself was elected by the people (Judges 11:11) (Wines, 1980:136-137, 107-110).

To be comparable in scope and effectiveness, there would need to be a similar ratio of judges (or jurors) across Europe under the proposed program. In other words, between thirty and fifty million local magistrates would officiate, mostly at the local levels. Decisions would likely be arrived at swiftly.

Legislative

Pre-Kings Israel had general legislative assemblies which met as the occasion required for the good of the nation (see Exodus 19:7-8; Numbers 1:16, 10:2-4, 16:2, 27:2, 36:1; Joshua 23:2, 24:1; and Judges 20:2). The two assemblies which were outlined in t he constitution were the upper house (the senate), and the lower house (the popular assembly, the "congregation of Israel") (Numbers 10:2-4). Neither house met often, since the need was less in a decentralized system. The tribes (and even the cities) fol lowed the same pattern, with their own senates and popular assemblies (II Samuel 8:6; I Kings 4:21) (Wines, 1980:130, 135, 182).

The national senate, which consisted of 70 members (Exodus 24:1; Numbers 26), was a council of state, formed by the chiefs of the clans (or collections of families) which were subdivisions of the tribes. The position of senator was apparently an elective office (e.g., Nashon in I Chronicles 2:10), with the senators elected from among the people of each tribe (Numbers 1:16). Their purpose was to represent the various tribes in such matters as boundary disputes and defense issues.

The lower house, which Wines refers to as the "Hebrew Commons," was a representative body (Numbers 1:16, 16:2). The leaders were elected by the people to serve in an Assembly (Numbers 10:4). Their purpose as a body was to represent the people of the nation of Israel as a whole, providing a direct link between them and the Prime Minister . When a law was enacted, the two bodies had to be in agreement, the Prime Minister (Judge) had to approve, and there could be no contradiction with the constitution (Wines, 1980:104-105, 198, 111, 98).

CONCLUSION

Like pre-Kings Israel, then, European integration under the proposed program would have a constitution approved by the European people as a whole, would be a confederative "nation of nations," and would have a republican form of government, with powers spelled out for the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. However, there would be no centralization of governmental power; instead, there would be a bottom-up decentralization, giving great latitude to the constituent nations.

There would be a Prime Minister, elected by the people to lead within the bounds of the constitution, and possibly serving from a rotating capital. Civil citizenship would be by birth and by means of "adoption," as it was traditionally granted in the United States (the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 defined naturalization as "the act of adopting a foreigner and clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen" [Boyd v. Nebraska ex re. Sayer, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1982)]) and would entail the right to vote and the right to hold office (North, 1980:49). There would be a bottom-up appeals court system, with the overwhelming majority of cases decided at the local level, and only the most difficult of cases going all the way to the supreme court. Finally, there would be a bicameral legislature, with the upper house elected to represent the individual nations, and the lower house elected to represent the people as a whole. The legislature would not be called into session as often as occurs in many nations today, since in the proposed system, most matters would be handled at the local level according to free market principles.

The economic system would be based on an open-borders free market system, with a fixed monetary standard and limitations on fractional reserve banking. There would be no central bank, enforced governmental currency, or centralized economic planning. The institution of property rights would be assumed by the constitution, and would be well-defined, transferable, and enforced.

Since the proposed program recognizes and relies on the shared value-system which already exists in Europe, the cultural basis would be sufficiently encompassing to work efficiently within this system. There would be no need for the creation of institutions to bring into existence cultural integration, because that which already exists would be ampl e.

In sum, then, the proposed program of European integration would consist of a system which would be heavily decentralized, with the focus being more local than continental. As this analysis has concluded, a decentralized confederative republic of European nations would meet the criteria for success which were established earlier: political, cultural, and economic integration.

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Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Wines, E.C. The Hebrew Republic . Uxbridge, MA: American Presbyterian Press, 1980.

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